In the first empirical study on how financial reforms have been instrumental in mitigating inequality through financial sector competition, we contribute at the same time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and respond to the growing field of economic development by means of informal sector promotion. Hitherto, unexplored financial sector concepts of formalization, semi-formalization and informalization are introduced. Four main findings are established: (1) while formal financial development decreases inequality, financial sector formalization increases it; (2) whereas semi-formal financial development increases inequality, the effect of financial semi-formalization is unclear; (3) both informal financial development and financial informalization have an income equalizing effect and; (4) non-formal financial development is pro-poor. Policy implications are discussed.
Introduction
After over two decades of financial reforms, poverty and inequality undoubtedly remain important challenges to economic and human developments in Africa. Despite this important policy concern, hitherto owing to the scarcity and lack of relevant data on incomeinequality, very little scholarly focus has been devoted to the continent (Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al., 2010; Asongu, 2012a) . In the 1980s and 1990s, most African countries embarked on a series of structural and policy adjustments in the financial sector as part of economic reforms with the ultimate goal of given impetus to economic growth as well as improving financial and economic efficiency (Janine & Elbadawi, 1991) . Surprisingly, as far as we have reviewed, there is currently no study that has investigated how financial reforms intended to address African dire needs have affected inequality through financial sector competition.
In light of the above, drawing from the experience of a continent that has been implementing development financial reforms, this study aims to investigate the incomeredistributive effects of financial reforms through financial sector competition. The contribution of the study to the literature is sixfold. Firstly, we restrict our sample to African countries because of their stubbornly high inequality levels despite over two decades of reforms (Asongu, 2012a) . Secondly, we steer clear of past literature that has failed to address the instrumentality of financial reforms and financial sector competition in investigating the finance-inequality nexus (Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al., 2010; Asongu, 2012a) . Thirdly, while past studies have assessed the inequality-finance nexus from a formal financial sector standpoint, we argue that failure to introduce the informal financial sector that captures most pro-poor financial activities is a substantial missing link in the literature (Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al., 2010; Asongu, 2012a) . Hence, we introduce measures of absolute and relative informal finance. Fourthly, two of the three studies in the literature identified above (Kai & Hamori, 2009; Asongu, 2012a) are based on data of the same time span .
Therefore, it could be argued that the studies have captured first generation financial reforms for the most part. Hence, the need for updated findings on second generational reforms for focused policy implications. Our data spans from 1996-2010. Fifthly, a motivation for this study also draws from the burgeoning phenomenon of knowledge economy (Asongu, 2012b) and soaring mobile banking activities (Asongu, 2012c) that are captured by the informal financial sector for the most part. Sixthly, the present study unites two streams of research by contributing at the same time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and responding to the growing field of economic development by means of informal sector promotion, microfinance, mobile banking, knowledge economy (KE)…etc, in suggesting a practicable way to disentangle the effects of various financial sectors on inequality. Ultimately, this study steers clear of existing African finance-inequality literature both from theoretical and methodological standpoints 2 .
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. Data and methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 2. Empirical analysis and discussion of results are reported in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Methodology

Data
We examine a panel of 28 African countries with data from the World Development (Asongu, 2012bc) .
The instrumental variables include measures of financial allocation efficiency (from banking system and financial system standpoints), financial activity (from banking system and financial system perspectives) and financial depth (from overall economic and financial system views). Three justifications could be provided for the choice of the three instrumental variables: (1) financial reforms sought to improve the transformation of mobilize financial resources into credit for economic operators (financial allocation efficiency); (2) the reforms also sought to improve financial activity through the granting of credit (financial activity), especially owing to the substantially documented issues of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions (Saxegaard, 2006) and; (3) the reforms were also intended to promote the creation of bank accounts so that a considerable chunk of the monetary base could transit via formal financial institutions (financial depth) so as to enhance monetary policy efficiency.
In the finance-inequality regressions, we control for economic prosperity (GDP growth), population growth, foreign aid, human development and trade. The effect of GDP growth on inequality is conditional on the even-distribution of fruits of economic prosperity;
hence the expected sign can be positive or negative. The impact of foreign aid on inequality is contingent on the quality of institutions. However, most foreign aid is channeled by locally based NGOs which directly affect the targeted population. Therefore we expect a negative sign. Population growth should increase inequality because the burden of demographic change in African countries is borne by the faction of the population in the low-income strata.
This expected sign is consistent with recent African inequality literature (AfDB, 2012, p. 3).
The effect of trade on inequality is ambiguous and depends on many factors. However from intuition, trade can either increase or decrease inequality depending on the proportion of the poor relying on agricultural exports. Cheap imports could increase savings and hence, indirectly improve the income-distribution of the poor. In the same line of thinking, too much imports of 'substitution goods' produced by domestic industries could fuel income-inequality if majority of the population in the lower-income brackets depend substantially on the affected industries for subsistence income. 
Methodology
Endogeneity
We are concerned with endogeneity for three main reasons: (1) we might have omitted some variables of financial sector reforms not incorporated in the FDSD; (2) while financial development affects inequality, it cannot be ruled-out that the state of inequality shapes financial policies (especially in the informal sector), hence an issue of reverse causality and;
(3) the problem statement by definition presupposes the existence of endogeneity by its contingency on the use of 'financial reform' instrumental variables. To tackle the endogeneity concern, we shall first assess its presence with the Hausman test before employing an estimation technique that is relevant to the outcome of the test.
Estimation technique
We adopt a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation technique for two reasons: on the one hand, it tackles the puzzle of endogeneity and; on the other hand, it is compatible with the problem statement of the study which aims to assess the instrumentality of financial reforms in the effect of financial sector competition on inequality.
Accordingly, IV estimation addresses the concern of endogeneity and hence avoids the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the exogenous variables are correlated with the error term in the main equation. The 2SLS estimation procedure will entail the following steps:
First-stage regression:
Second-stage regression:
In Equation 2, X is a set of control variables (GDP growth, population growth, foreign aid, human development and trade). In the first and second equations, it  and it  respectively represent the error terms. Instrumental variables are: money supply, liquid liabilities, banking system efficiency, financial system efficiency, banking system activity and financial system activity. Inequality represents the GINI index. We adopt the following steps in the IV analysis: (1) justify the choice of a 2SLS over an OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (2) verify the instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of the explaining variables (financial sector competition channels) and; (3) ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the main equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. Further robustness checks will be ensured with; (1) robust Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors and; (2) the use of two-year, three-year and five-year non-overlapping intervals (NOI) to mitigate shortrun disturbances that may loom substantially large.
Empirical analysis
Presentation of results
This section aims to tackle the two main issues discussed in the motivation of the paper, notably: (1) whether financial sector reforms are instrumental in the effect of financial sector competition on inequality and; (2) assessing how financial sector competition plays out in inequality reduction. Specifically, addressing the second issue will depend on the results of the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Improvement of the formal financial sector both in absolute (GDP-based) and relative (M2-based) terms mitigates inequality. Proposition 1 and Proposition 5 will tackle this hypothesis in absolute and relative views respectively.
Hypothesis 2: The semi-formal financial sector decreases inequality both in absolute (GDPbased) and relative (M2-based) terms. Proposition 2 and Proposition 6 will examine this hypothesis in absolute and relative terms respectively.
Hypothesis 3:
The informal financial sector mitigates inequality both in absolute (GDP-based) and relative (M2-based) terms. Proposition 3 and Proposition 7 will assess this hypothesis from absolute and relative perspectives respectively.
Hypothesis 4:
The non-formal (informal and semi-formal) financial sector decreases inequality both in absolute (GDP-based) and relative (M2-based) terms. Proposition 4 and Proposition 8 will address this hypothesis from absolute and relative standpoints respectively.
Whereas the first issue is addressed by the Sargan OIR test, tackling the second depends on both the results of the Sargan OIR test and the significance of estimated coefficients (propositions). The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is the position that, the financial sector reforms explain inequality only through financial sector competition mechanisms, conditional on the control variables. Hence, a rejection of this null hypothesis is a rejection of the view that the financial sector reform instruments do not explain inequality beyond financial sector competition channels. A Hausman test is performed before every 2SLS-IV approach. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that, estimated coefficients by OLS are efficient and consistent. Therefore, a rejection of this null hypothesis points to the concern of endogeneity due to inconsistent estimates and hence, lends credit to the choice of the IV estimation technique. Accordingly, for all the models (Table 2-3), there is an overwhelming rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test, hence, lending credit to the appropriateness of the choice of an IV estimation technique. As concerns the first issue, the failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan test in all the models is an indication that, financial sector reforms are instrumental in the effect of financial sector competition on inequality. With regard to the second issue, the following could be established from the findings of Tables 2-3 summarized in Table 1 . (1) 
Discussion of results and policy implications
Discussion of results
The conclusions from the tested hypotheses are as follows: (1) formal and informal financial development have an inequality mitigating tendency; (2) financial sector formalization (informalization) increases (decreases) inequality; (3) semiformal financial development has an income disequalizing effect and; (4) nonformal financial development has a positive income redistributive effect. We shall devote space to discussing the formal and informal financial sectors in detail because, for them we have obtained significant results both in terms of GDP and money supply (M2).
Firstly, the fact that formal and informal financial developments have an inequality mitigating tendency implies that, an improvement in their shares relative to economic prosperity (GDP growth) decreases inequality. This interpretation can be further elucidated on two counts. On the one hand, holding GDP growth and other things constant, formal and informal financial development which are constituents of GDP growth will mitigate poverty by its equalizing effect on income-distribution. On the other hand, if the shares of formal and informal financial sector developments in GDP growth are greater in comparison to other macroeconomic components of GDP growth, the direct effect on income distribution will be an equalizing one. The equalizing effect of the formal financial sector is consistent with recent African inequality literature (Batuo et al., 2010) . From a broader point of view, the findings are also in line with empirical (Beck et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009 ) and theoretical (Galor & Zeira, 1993; Banerjee & Newman, 1993 ) literature which postulate a negative and linear relationship between financial development and incomeinequality.
Secondly, the negative (positive) income redistributive effect of financial sector formalization (informalization) means, the effect of the formal financial sector (growing at the expense of other financial sectors) increases inequality whereas the effect of the informal financial sector (growing to the detriment of other financial sectors) decreases inequality. This explanation is logical from common sense because, the increase in bank deposits (liquid liabilities) in the formal banking sector can only result from the fruits of the faction of the population in possession of bank accounts, which is that of the higher-or middle-income brackets. In the same line of thought, when growth in money supply (M2) or an extensive use of currency in an economy transits through the formal banking sector to the detriment of the informal and semi-formal financial sectors, the natural consequence is soaring inequality. This interpretation can further be substantiated with present-day statistics which show that, most formal banking institutions are concentrated in urban areas of African countries. With a substantial proportion of the poor domiciled in rural areas without access to bank accounts, a competitive advantage in the formal banking sector's shares of M2 is not good for the poor.
Policy implications
Based on the weight of available empirical evidence, we recommend the following to governments of sampled countries in particular and developing countries in general. (1) Encourage the establishment of formal financial institutions in rural areas. But why? We have found that formal banking growth in GDP terms is pro-poor (Proposition 1). However, policies of formal banking establishment in rural areas should not be at the expense of informal financial development; as we have also found that financial sector formalization (or growth in M2 terms) is not pro-poor (Proposition 5). (2) As an overall policy recommendation, the poor should be provided incentives for bank account creation. The broad significance of the results demonstrates that financial development is essential in reducing income inequality in African countries. Widening access to informal financial intermediary markets (by means of new KE mechanisms, mobile banking…etc), especially by targeting those at the lower income strata and the rural population would help reduce the persistent income gap between the rural and urban population. A possible way of improving financial access to the poor is to oriented policy towards the reduction of information asymmetries that increase the operating cost of financial institutions.
Conclusion
In the first empirical study on how financial reforms have been instrumental in mitigating inequality through financial sector competition, we have contributed at the same time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and responded to the growing field of economic development by means of informal sector promotion. Hitherto, unexplored financial sector concepts of formalization, semi-formalization and informalization have been introduced. Four main findings have been established: (1) while formal financial development decreases inequality, financial sector formalization increases it; (2) whereas semi-formal financial development increases inequality, the effect of financial semi-formalization is unclear; (3) both informal financial development and financial informalization have an income equalizing effect and; (4) non-formal financial development is pro-poor. Policy implications have been discussed. 
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